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Governments employ a lot of people ￿ in the US around 20m people work for the 
government, and in Britain about 3.5m do so
1. The productivity of these workers, 
forming such a substantial fraction of the labour force (15% in the US, more than are 
employed in manufacturing at 13%) is therefore a major issue for these economies. 
Beyond their simple numerical importance, many governments have an explicit 
agenda of improving the efficiency of public service delivery
2. Examples include 
Osborne and Gaebler￿s influential (1993) book ￿Reinventing Government￿, promoted 
by Vice-President Gore in the US, and a UK Government White Paper, ￿Modernising 
Government￿ (1999). One way often proposed to boost productivity in the public 
sector is to use explicit financial incentives. But while theorists have addressed the 
role of such incentives in the public sector, a number of surveys have noted that the 
advance of theory has outstripped the available evidence
3.  
 
This paper begins to fill the gap.  We evaluate a pilot programme of the use of team-
based financial incentives in a large UK public agency. The agency, Jobcentre Plus, is 
one of the main government agencies dealing with the public; its role is to place the 
unemployed into jobs and administer benefits. The nature of the incentive scheme 
allows us to investigate a number of important issues in the theoretical literature. First, 
what is the impact of an explicit financial incentive scheme on public sector workers? 
Dixit￿s (2002) review of theoretical contributions suggests that such incentives may 
be counter-productive. Second, what is the impact of a team-based incentive scheme? 
Economists have typically been skeptical of a team basis for obvious free-rider 
problems
4, and such effects have been estimated (Gaynor and Pauly (1990); see also 
Gaynor et al, 2001). Knez and Simester (2001) argue that peer monitoring outweighed 
such effects in a scheme in Continental Airlines based on large teams. The incentive 
scheme we analyze was introduced across teams of very different sizes and structures, 
                                                 
1 Total public employment for the US comes from OECD (2001) and relates to all levels of 
government, in 2000. For the UK (not reported in the OECD report), the data are from Black, Herbert 
and Richardson (2003) and again relate to 2000.  
2 Concern is not limited to developed countries: see the World Development Report (2003) also 
highlights the problem 
3 See Dixit (2002), Prendergast (1999) and Burgess and Ratto (2003) for recent surveys.   4
and this allows us to quantify the impact of these factors. Third, how do workers 
respond to relative task measurement precision in an explicitly multi-tasking 
environment? The implications of multi-tasking for scheme design are a major part of 
the literature on incentives. The incentive scheme in Jobcentre Plus incorporated five 
targets, covering most of the tasks of the agency. These were measured with very 
different degrees of precision, and we can evaluate the response to these different 
targets. There are a number of other issues that we plan to investigate using this data, 
including the scope for gaming the system, but these are saved for future work. 
 
Our results suggest that the scheme was effective in raising job placements in certain 
contexts, though the overall average effect was close to zero. We find significant 
heterogeneity of response that fits with important free rider effects in production. The 
impact of the incentive scheme is greatest in small offices and in districts with fewer 
offices. Thus while some mechanism such as peer monitoring does overcome the free-
riding problem in small teams, it appears not to do so in large teams. We find that 
quantity increased, but that the scheme had little effect on the quality of service. The 
results suggest that relative measurement precision in a multi-tasking context is 
important. It is inherent in the scheme design that quantity is measured much more 
precisely that quality, and we find very different impact of the incentives on these 
outcomes.  The scheme design was not optimal in a number of ways and these are 
briefly discussed in the Conclusion.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews the evidence on 
public sector incentive schemes. Section 3 describes the nature of the organisation and 
the incentive scheme introduced; it also sets out our modelling framework and 
identification strategy. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 presents estimation 




Recent surveys of the large literature on incentives in organisations are available in 
Prendergast (1999), Malcomson (1999), Murphy (1999), Dixit (2002) and Chiappori 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Holmstrom (1982) provides the formalisation.   5
and SalaniØ (2003); see also Lazear￿s (1999) overview of personnel economics. Most 
of the research in this field is theoretical. Much of the empirical work relates to CEOs 
and the importance of share options. One notable exception to this is Lazear￿s (2000) 
study of the introduction of performance pay. There is very little evidence on the role 
and impact of performance pay in the public sector; Burgess and Ratto (2003) provide 
a review. In this section we briefly discuss some of this evidence, relating specifically 
to public sector organisations, and to team-based schemes. 
 
One important source of data in the public sector has been the Job Training 
Partnership Agency (JTPA) programme. Under the JTPA system, local training 
centres receive monetary rewards based on the employment levels and wage rates 
attained by graduates of the programme. Heckman, Smith and Taber (1996) 
investigate the incentive to ￿cream-skim￿ in the scheme by only taking the best 
training candidates. By contrast, they find that people with lower expected earnings 
are significantly more likely to be accepted into the programme. Courty and Marschke 
(1997, 2004) examine how the incentive structure of the JTPA programme leads to 
gaming of the system. They show that the structure affects the way in which the 
programme administrators report outcomes and the effect of their timing strategies on 
efficiency.  Kahn, Silva and Ziliak (2001) examine the impact on the Brazilian tax 
collection authority of the introduction of performance pay. The reform involved the 
payment of financial incentives based on individual and team performance in 
detecting and fining tax evaders. The amounts involved were substantial, frequently 
providing bonuses over twice mean annual salary. The findings show that the scheme 
had a dramatic effect: fine collections per inspection were 75% higher than in the 
estimated counter-factual.  
 
Turning to explicitly team-based schemes, Knez and Simester (2001) look at a firm-
level incentive scheme introduced by Continental Airlines in 1995, offering bonuses 
to some 35,000 staff.  One would expect free-riding to dominate any reaction to the 
scheme, since any one individual￿s influence on the outcome is bound to be 
negligible. Identification is achieved by comparing outsourced airports with non-
outsourced airports, and the results show that performance did in fact increase by 
more in the latter. The positive effect is interpreted as the result of mutual (peer) 
monitoring. This is often thought to be ineffective in large firms, but Knez and   6
Simester argue that peer monitoring worked in Continental because employees 
worked in relatively small autonomous groups, within which monitoring and 
enforcement of group norms can be sustainable.  
 
The importance of mutual monitoring and group norms has also been identified by 
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003). The authors provide an empirical analysis of 
the relationship between team incentives, worker participation, worker heterogeneity 
and productivity. They use data at a garment factory (Koret) in California, which 
between 1995 and 1997 offered the opportunity to its workers to engage in team 
production. The analysis, based on weekly productivity data over the years 1995-1997 
for 288 employees, shows that the introduction of teams was associated with a 14% 
increase in productivity, on average.  Moreover, some workers joined teams despite 
an absolute decrease in pay suggesting that teams offer non-pecuniary benefits to 
workers. These findings would suggest the presence of non-pecuniary benefits from 
teamwork, which might alleviate the free riding problem. Falk and Ichino (2003) 
provide experimental evidence on the importance of peer pressure in a work setting. 
They show that people working together tend to work at a similar rate, and that on 
average peer pressure tends to raise productivity. 
 
Another part of this literature looks at professional practices and partnerships. Gaynor 
and Pauly (1990) investigate the determinants of productive efficiency in partnerships 
based on individual responses to compensation structures. The context is one with 
different partnerships having (endogenously) different correlations between 
compensation and productivity. They showed that output was greater where 
compensation was more directly related to productivity, and that practices with more 
members produced less output. Kandel and Lazear (1992) set out a model of peer 
pressure, norm creation and free-riding in this context. They discuss the importance of 
unit size in some detail and show that peer pressure rises to some point with size, and 
then declines. Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer (1997) construct a model of the extent 
of performance pay in compensation contracts, allowing for group norms. This model 
is tested on medical group practices and it is found, as predicted, that the size of the 
group has a significant influence on the distribution of compensation. More recently, 
Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor (2001) look at incentives for doctors in HMO (health 
maintenance organisation) practices and find significant effects. Differences in HMO   7
size are key to identifying the impact of incentives, these being assumed random. So 






(a) The Structure of Jobcentre Plus 
 
The role of Jobcentre Plus (JP) is to help place people into jobs, to advise on training 
and to administer benefits. It was launched in October 2001, amalgamating the 
functions of two agencies: the Benefits Agency (BA), responsible for administering 
benefits to the unemployed, lone parents and others, and the Employment Service 
(ES), responsible for job placement. The method of delivering these services also 
began to change with 56 new ￿Pathfinder￿ offices providing an integrated service, 
combining the work of the original, separate, benefits offices and employment offices. 
This process of change is slow, and most offices ￿ there are 1464 in total ￿ remain 
single service providers as ex-BA or ex-ES offices; more Pathfinder offices were 
created through the year of the pilot scheme. There are few operational links between 
offices in a district
5 - that is, the work of non-Pathfinder offices is largely unaffected 
by the presence of Pathfinder offices in the district, and different offices are largely 
self-contained. The districts with the new-style offices were designated Pathfinder 
districts; at April 2002, these made up 17 out of 90 districts in total.  
 
(b) The Nature of the Incentive Scheme 
 
The initial drive for the introduction of financial incentives was political, originating 
in the White Paper ￿Modernising Government￿ (1999). This was followed up in the 
Makinson report (2000) for the Public Sector Productivity Panel, advocating incentive 
schemes for front line government workers; this study evaluates one of these schemes. 
The pilot incentive scheme ran from April 2002 to March 2003. The main relevant 
features of the scheme are as follows.  
 
                                                 
5 The incentive scheme introduces behavioural links.   8
Teams 
This is a team-based scheme. The unit chosen as the basis for the team was the 
district: the targets are defined at district level, all workers in the district get the bonus 
if the target is hit, and the district manager is responsible for achieving the target. 
These are big teams - there are only 90 districts covering the whole of the country, 
varying in size from 5 to 39 offices in the team, and from 264 and 1535 people within 




The pilot scheme introduced the incentive structure in the 17 Pathfinder districts, 
leaving 73 districts as controls. So all offices in the Pathfinder districts were 
incentivised as part of the district team, and no offices in the control districts were 
incentivised. This raises two issues for identification: how districts were chosen as 
Pathfinder districts, and how we can distinguish between the effects of the incentive 
scheme and the effects of the introduction of Pathfinder offices. We discuss these 
below.  
 
Threshold incentive payment 
In common with many schemes, the form adopted was a step function, based on a 
threshold level of performance. Workers were paid straight salary up to the threshold, 
the bonus was paid for hitting the threshold, and then no further increase in 
remuneration for further output. Thus incentives are very sharp at output levels just 
below the threshold but weaker further below or above. The scheme was originally set 
up to offer 1% of salary for each target hit plus an additional 2.5% if all were hit, 
though the details evolved slightly through the period of the pilot
7. The targets for the 




                                                 
6 See Knez and Simester (2001) for a recent paper analysing the impact of incentives within big teams. 
7 The final bonus was actually based around standard rates, which varied with the job grade per target 
hit. If all five targets are achieved there is an extra 50% of the standard rate. This means that if all five 
targets were hit, a band A worker would earn an extra £750, whereas a band G job would get £3,750 
more. 
8 Note that all districts have clear targets set for all functions, but in the control districts these were not 
incentivised. The terminology of JP describes these base goals as targets and the higher levels as   9
One central issue in the design of incentive structures is the importance of multi-
tasking. In particular, a trade-off between quantity produced and quality is often 
crucial
9. This incentive scheme recognized that and included targets for five different 
functions. These were: job placements, customer service, employer service, other 
business delivery functions, and reducing benefit calculation error and fraud. Teams 
were offered 1% of salary for each target hit (provided a minimum of 2 were hit) and 
a further bonus of 2.5% on top of that if all five were hit. Clearly the definition and 
measurement of the target variables is important.  
 
Job placements, job entries in JP￿s terminology, are measured as weighted numbers of 
clients who are found work by the office; this is the main quantity output measure. 
The weights are points based on a priority system imposed by the government ￿ for 
example, a jobless lone parent attracts 12 points, compared to 4 points for a short-term 
unemployed claimant, and 1 point for an already-employed worker
10. Extra points 
also accrue if the worker is not back on unemployment benefit within four weeks, and 
also in certain priority areas. Customer service captures aspects of quality: speed, 
accuracy, pro-activity of service, and the nature of the office environment. This relates 
to both clients and employers. It is measured by independent analysis of 
questionnaires to employers and ￿mystery shopping￿ techniques. The employer 
outcome target is the flip side of job placements, a measure of whether and how 
quickly vacancies were filled. This was measured (again independently) by a survey 
of employers. It only has low correlation with placements. The business delivery 
target covers a wide range of other functions, and appears to be an attempt to measure 
everything else that the offices do. It includes two targets for benefit calculation 
accuracy, appropriate labour market interventions, and basic skills and incapacity 
screening. It is measured by checking samples of cases. The overall score on this 
performance measure is simply the average over the five categories. The final target is 
the Monetary Value of Fraud and Error, focused on two particular benefits ￿ Income 
Support and Jobseeker￿s Allowance. This is measured by specialist teams visiting 
each district and examining samples of cases. In fact, the measurement and tracking of 
this particular target was and remains obscure. All 17 Pathfinder districts were treated 
                                                                                                                                            
￿stretch￿. In this paper we keep to the standard economics terminology and describe the higher levels of 
output required to win the bonus as the targets. 
9 See Paarsch and Shearer (2000) for an analysis of this issue.   10
as a single virtual region, and the reporting of the progress on achieving the target was 
very delayed. We ignore this particular target in the analysis below.  
 
Hierarchy: measurement, reward and production. 
One final relevant characteristic of the scheme is that the different targets were 
measured at different levels of the JP hierarchy. Job Entries were measured monthly 
at office level, Customer Service and Employer Outcome were measured quarterly at 
district level, and Business Delivery at district level at irregular intervals. This 
measurement structure has implications for our econometric analysis, but also for the 
likely behavioural response of workers in JP, which we discuss below. Note that this 
produces quite a complex hierarchical structure. Essentially the office is the core unit 
in terms of production (that is, there appear to be few operational reasons for cross-
office interaction), the district is imposed as the decision-making unit in terms of 
reward, and the measurement structure works off the office for some targets and the 
district for others.  
 
When output is measured at office level but assessed for bonus purposes at district 
level, the district manager assumes a crucial role in communicating how well offices 
are doing relative to the district threshold. The allocation by district managers of 
office-level targets may help alleviate the free-rider problem if the manager had good 
information about office capabilities, but could be counter-productive if based on poor 
information. When output is measured only at district level, there would not be the 
same information flow on progress. This suggests that there are differences in the 
free-rider issue within offices and between offices within districts. We therefore 
consider these separately in the empirical work. 
 
(c) Theoretical issues 
 
The design of an optimal incentive scheme is a complex matter. The nature of the 
organisation, the size of the team, the measurability of output, the multidimensionality 
and the nature of tasks are all elements to be considered in the design of team-based 
incentives and in any evaluation of a scheme. We consider the implications for worker 
behaviour of the way the scheme has been designed at JP. Of course, incentive 
                                                                                                                                            
10 For full details on this and the other targets see Burgess et al (2003) cmpo dp.   11
schemes also impact on selection of workers into organisations (see Lazear, 2001, 
Dxiit, 2002, Besley and Ghatak, 2003), but the timescale of this pilot and the 
relatively low staff turnover suggest that in this context the main effects will come 
through changes in the behaviour of incumbent workers. 
 
Team size and structure 
Teams are defined to be very large, all the offices in a district. Note that this ￿team￿ is 
created by the reward system only. Individual rewards depend upon the performance 
of the district, but there is no production basis for a district level team: whilst staff 
interact within offices, there is little need for interactions between team members 
located in different offices. Such a broad definition of teams may make it hard for 
team members to identify with their teams. This is likely to intensify free rider 
problems.  Holmstrom (1982) provides one of the seminal contributions to the theory 
of incentives in teams and shows that a negative externality is created in an 
environment in which output is fully shared among team members.  The agent who 
cheats will not pay in full for the consequences of her act, and hence she will choose 
an inefficiently low level of effort. This free-rider problem becomes more difficult to 
tackle the greater the uncertainty in output measurement and the greater the size of the 
team. In fact the free rider problem in the context of JP is not exactly equivalent to 
Holmstr￿m￿s case, which is caused by the final output being fully shared among team 
members. The issue in JP is more akin to voluntary contributions of effort to a public 
good outcome (hitting the target). The theoretical predictions both from the 
Holmstr￿m paper and the literature on voluntary contributions to public goods
11 
suggest that the greater the number of agents the more serious the free-rider problem. 
As noted above, Kandel and Lazear (1994) consider how the off-setting strength of 
peer pressure varies with unit size.  
 
Multi-tasking and the Measurement Technology 
JP is a complex organisation and staff are required to deliver a range of services. 
Theory suggests that this matters for the outcome of the scheme. In particular, if the 
different activities are substitutes, the use of high powered incentive schemes may 
have undesirable effects upon overall performance. Exerting more effort on one task 
                                                 
11 See Olson (1971)   12
increases the marginal cost of any task that is a substitute and agents may focus their 
efforts upon one or a few tasks to the neglect of others. In this case each outcome 
cannot be rewarded in isolation and the principal should use lower incentives 
(Holmstr￿m and Milgrom, 1990, 1991).  
 
An interesting case related to this situation is when activities are substitutes from the 
perspective of the agents (more time spent on one activity means less time on others), 
but they are complements from the perspective of the principal (the principal wants 
high performance in all of them). Hence the agent is willing to devote more time to 
the less difficult activities, whereas the principal prefers him to devote time to all 
activities. This situation is analysed by Marx and MacDonald (2001). They show that, 
if the principal is unsure about the agent￿s preferences over tasks, setting rewards on 
success on individual tasks may be suboptimal in that it may induce workers to focus 
and specialise in the less costly tasks.  
 
It is likely that both positive and negative interdependencies are present in the JP 
context. For example, good performance on customer service target and employer 
outcome may  have spillover effects on job entries
12. In contrast, more time spent on 
accurately processing benefit claims leaves less time to be devoted to job placements.  
 
A crucial aspect in a multi-tasking context is how precisely the different dimensions 
of output are measured. If each outcome could be rewarded in isolation, the optimal 
scheme would set higher incentives on the better measured outcomes
13. However, in a 
context with multiple dimensions of output, this would lead to a misallocation of 
effort by the agent. Therefore the principal has to weaken the incentives on the more 
accurately measured tasks. The prediction of the standard models on moral hazard 
when output is measured with error is that low powered incentive schemes should be 
used when the different outcomes are measured with differential precision (Dixit, 
2000). 
                                                 
12 There are two parts to this. First, a simple accounting feature that placing a job-seeker in a vacancy 
notified by a firm to the Jobcentre Plus office directly boosts performance on both targets. Second, a 
behavioural factor that understanding the customers￿ requests, meeting their individual needs and 
giving them accurate information (the ￿proactivity and accuracy￿ elements of the Customer Service 
target) may speed up the process of filling vacancy and facilitate the creation of job entries. 
13 There is a trade-off between risk and incentives. See Prendergast (2002), Dixit (2000), for a general 
discussion.    13
 
The five targets in the JP scheme involve very different measurement precision. The 
main quantity factor, job entries, is measured most precisely ￿ it is a well-defined 
concept, and is measured directly from the management information database monthly 
at office level. By contrast, the quality of service to job-seekers and employers is 
measured by sample survey. Furthermore it is measured at district level and quarterly. 
This can only give a much vaguer measure of a worker￿s effort on these tasks.  
 
What is the optimal response of an employee given this reward structure and 
measurement technology? The rewards for hitting each target are the same, but the 
cost of employee effort on quantity and quality is unknown to us, as is the relative 
effort required to hit the target. It may be that these are known to the senior 
management of JP and are factored into the design of the scheme. In which case, 
workers will allocate their effort in line with the principal￿s optimum ￿ possibly 
equally across tasks. If this is assuming too high a degree of sophistication in setting 
the parameters of the incentive scheme, absent substantial differences in effort costs 
across targets, we would expect a worker to focus more effort on the quantity target, 
because of the lower noise.  
 
Threshold reward scheme 
Given the difficulty of relating effort to measured performance on some targets, and 
that team bonuses are paid whenever two targets are hit, we can expect to observe 
gaming.  Offices may focus their attention on a few targets rather than aiming to hit 
all five targets.  Furthermore, the threshold nature of the scheme with additional 
performance beyond the target not being compensated means that workers will aim to 





Focussing on the quantity target first, we adopt a standard job matching approach to 
the determination of job entries. Job entry points (JEP) in office o at time t depend on 
the available vacancies (V) and jobseekers (U), plus a set of office characteristics   14
(W)
14. The key variable for our purposes is the job placement effort of the office staff, 
α . This takes the following form, where v is noise: 
) exp( ot ot ot ot ot ot W U V JEP ν α
δ γ =        ( 1 )  
We allow the output of quality measures to depend on the same set of factors, though 
this is less obviously based in a standard economic approach. For quality of service, 
staff effort has an obvious impact, as potentially do a variety of office characteristics. 
The state of the labour market may well also matter. It may be that it has a direct 
impact on the quality of service, and it may be that it has an impact on perceptions of 
quality in that tight (slack) labour markets may lead to employers (workers) blaming 
the JP office for their lack of a match. 
 
Effort Process 
Bringing all aspects of the incentive scheme into a single model would be very 
cumbersome, for the gain of little additional insight. Instead we adopt a more 
straightforward approach. We briefly review the model for an individual￿s decision on 
a single output, and then discuss the extensions to a two-level team structure, and a 
multiple target setting.  We omit subscripts here for clarity. 
 
Let individual output be given by: 
ε + + = Z e a y .        ( 2 )  
where y is output, a is the worker￿s ability, e is the worker￿s effort, Z is an exogenous, 
time-varying factor influencing output (the state of the labour market), and ε  is noise.  
Z  has mean Z
e and is given by  ξ + ≡
e Z Z .  The distribution function of (ξ  + ε)  is F . 
Worker utility is simply given by U = w ￿ c(e), where c(e) is the cost of effort. The 
pay scheme is: 
) ( . y y k w w > ℑ + =         (3) 
where w is straight salary, k is the bonus and  (.) ℑ equals 1 if (.) is true, 0 otherwise. 
The bonus threshold is assumed to be: 
1 ), . (
0 0 > + = = λ λ λ
e Z e a y y      (4) 
with y
0 (e
0) being the ￿traditional￿ or standard output (effort) level. So (λ  ￿ 1) is the 
additional output required for the bonus. The worker￿s problem is to choose e to 
                                                 
14 See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a review of evidence on this.   15
maximise utility before ξ  and ε  are realised. It is useful to define x as the extra effort 
above e
0:  x e e + ≡
0 . The solution for x
* is: 
() ( ) ( )
e Z e a x a f a k x e c + − + − = + ′
0 * * 0 . 1 . . . ) ( λ      (5) 
This equates the marginal cost of effort and the marginal benefit. The latter is the 
value of the bonus, k, multiplied by the effect of an extra unit of effort on the 
probability of hitting the threshold, and by ability.  
 
So optimal individual effort depends on: two common policy parameters (k, the size 
of the bonus, and (λ  ￿ 1) the required increase); environmental parameters (Z
e and f(.), 
the mean and variability of ξ  and ε);  and individually-varying parameters ( () c′ , the 
cost of effort, a, ability and e
0 , past effort). Having set out this basic model, we 
consider two dimensions in which the pilot scheme is more complex than this. 
Broadening out to the office level raises the issues of free-riding within the office, and 
free-riding across offices within districts. One simple way of summarising this is to 
assume that we can multiply the level of individual effort derived above by a factor β  
depending on office size, N, and on office and district characteristics, θ . This gives us 
a final effort equation: 
() (.) , , , (.), , 1 , ). , (
0 * * f Z e a c k e N e
e ′ − = λ θ β      (6) 
Office level effort, α , is simply the sum of this over all workers in the office. This can 
be substituted into (1) to determine office output.  
 
This describes optimal effort on one task in isolation, but clearly individuals and 
offices need to consider the allocation of effort to the full range of tasks. This would 
involve solving jointly for the optimal effort on each task, as a function of the 
marginal benefit and cost of effort on all of the tasks. In general, this would mean that 
the determinants of optimal effort on any one task would be vectors of the set of 
variables on (6) defined across all tasks. However, the empirical implementation of 
this is less straightforward. The simple marginal benefit to each task is the same at 1% 
of salary per target hit. The relative marginal cost of effort on each task, past effort 
and worker ability are unobserved and all we can do is assume them to be constant 
across tasks.  The state of the labour market is the same for all tasks. There is a clear 
difference between processes in the measurement precision, but that difference does   16
not vary across offices. Therefore the only aspect of the trade-off between effort on 
the different tasks that we can investigate is that arising from the system-wide 
difference in measurement precision.  
 
(e) Empirical Model 
 
Our empirical approach derives from (1) for the production function and (6) for the 
determination of effort. We address three main questions. First, is the behaviour of 
public sector workers influenced by financial incentives? Second, does free-riding 
matter in a team-based incentive scheme? We sub-divide this into the free-riding 
deriving from many workers in an office, and into that arising from many offices in a 
district. Third, does the differential measurement precision of the different targets 
influence behaviour?  
 
Our dependent variables are (log) job entry points, and two measures of quality: 
quality of service to job seekers (￿customer service￿) and the quality of service to 
firms (the quality component of ￿employer outcome￿). We take the inflow of new 
job-seekers and new vacancies as measures of the state of the labour market and use 
the (new vacancy/new job-seeker) ratio
15. Office characteristics are the number of 
staff (see below), a measure of staff ability, whether the office is a Pathfinder office 
(established or created in-period), and whether the office is the district headquarters. 
We adopt a log functional form for job entry points, staff and the labour market 
characteristics. 
 
We take two approaches. First, we run this model on each office￿s annual total of job 
entry points. This provides our first main results. Second, we adopt a two-stage 
approach, run the regression on monthly data over the year to isolate an office average 
effect and then analyse that in relation to the office and district characteristics. This 
has the advantage of allowing us to estimate separately the two effects of the labour 
market (see below). The first stage is:  
() ot t ot ot d d o odt Z βN IS y υ δ α γ µ + + + + + ∆ + =       (7) 
                                                 
15 The inflow of vacancies may be considered potentially endogenous ￿ efficient offices attract more 
vacancies. We repeat the main analysis using just the job-seeker inflow, and the conclusions are largely 
unchanged (results are available from the authors).   17
where y is log total job entry points (tjep) in office o in district d at month t, N is the 
number of staff, and Z is the labour market variable.  We allow for an office effect µ , 
a district effect ∆ , and an effect from IS ￿  incentive scheme status.  Finally, δ   is a set 
of time dummies, and ν  is random noise. A fixed effects regression on (7) above will 
identify α, β, δ , and φ o where: 
d d o o IS γ µ φ + ∆ + ≡         ( 8 )  




We adopt two strategies for identification. Recall that assignment to the pilot scheme 
is at district level, and was based on a district being designated a Pathfinder district ￿ 
a district with at least one Pathfinder office in. There are two points here. First and 
most important, assignment of offices other than the Pathfinder office itself to the 
pilot is random. Those offices are in the pilot on grounds entirely unrelated to their 
own performance and characteristics
16. The second issue is how those Pathfinder 
offices were chosen. There are two factors in this ￿ offices and districts. Individual 
offices were chosen for Pathfinder status on the grounds that their management would 
be able to cope well with the demands of the new structure ￿ clearly this is likely to be 
correlated with other outcomes. From the set of such offices, districts were selected to 
be representative, designed to achieve a ￿cross-section of different communities and 
customer bases, i.e. from large inner-city offices to those in smaller towns, suburbs 
and rural areas.￿
17 This suggests that assignment at district level to the treatment 
category is stratified random. The two mechanisms together imply that for offices 
other than the Pathfinder office itself, assignment to the scheme at is random.  Given 
random assignment, straightforward regression on the model above is then 
appropriate.  
 
Second, to allow for any residual non-random assignment we also implement a 
propensity score matching approach. The assumption of mean independence 
                                                 
16 Offices are only linked together in districts through spatial proximity, not through performance 
levels, for example. Of course, there may be spatial factors influencing performance, but we control for 
the main factors here. 
17 Private communication.   18
conditional on the estimated score is weaker than in the first strategy. As we explain 




We take data from JP￿s management information system and from their personnel 
database. We merge on to this unemployment and vacancy data from the local labour 
market, and also data on the local public/private wage differential, as a control for 
differences in the quality of staff. 
  
Management information data records performance against the five targets. Job entry 
points (JEP) achieved for each office on a monthly basis are the measure of quantity.  
The quality outcomes are reported for each district on a quarterly basis.  A basic 
description of this data is on Appendix 1. It shows wide variation in JEP across 
offices and time, but much less variation (and fewer observations) for the survey-
based measures of quality. 
 
This is predominantly a human capital intensive organisation, and we have detailed 
staff data: the number of staff in each grade for each office, recorded monthly. These 
are also described in Appendix 1.  The numbers in different grades appear in more-or-
less fixed proportions. For example, there is about one Executive Officer (EO) to two 
Administrative Officers (AO). Consequently, including numbers of each grade in the 
analysis leads to severe multicollinearity. We therefore define a measure of front-line 
staff: the office total of all numbers in EO and AO grades for use in the analysis. 
 
Clearly the quality of the workers is an important consideration and there is no reason 
to expect it to be constant across the country. Traditionally, public sector jobs pay less 
than private sector jobs, and perhaps the key margin for JP workers is between these 
jobs and private sector jobs. We therefore take as a proxy for quality the local 
public/private sector wage differential (see Nickell and Quintini, 2002, for a detailed 
discussion of this). Our variable is derived from the Labour Force Survey Small Areas 
dataset.  We constructed the wage gap between the private sector and the public sector   19
for each local authority looking at the relative hourly wage of full-time workers. This 
was matched to the office postcode.  
 
We have no information on the state of the capital (principally computing and 
communications equipment) in offices. We do know which offices are Pathfinder 
offices, however. It is important to identify these for three reasons. First, they do have 
newer technology installed and generally refurbished premises. Second, they were 
also subject to restructuring in which the managers had to oversee the convergence of 
ex-ES and ex-BA offices.  JP has estimated that Pathfinder offices took at least five 
months to adjust. Third, even beyond the adjustment period, Pathfinder offices fulfil 
more roles than regular ex-ES or ex-BA offices; consequently we would expect their 
productivity as measured on any one task to be lower. We separately identify the first 
tranche of Pathfinder offices created by October 2001, which would therefore have 
completed the process of readjustment by the start of the incentive scheme in April 
2002, and Pathfinder offices created later.  
 
Using the postcode (zip code) for each JP office, we locate each office in a Travel To 
Work Area
18 (TTWA98).  We then extract claimant inflow and vacancy inflow data 
from NOMIS
19 for each TTWA and for each month. Whilst the matching function  
uses the unemployment and vacancy stocks, we cannot take these as exogenous as 
they are influenced by the outflow rate, our dependent variable. So we use the inflow, 
both of unemployed claimants and of vacancies, and take the latter divided by the 
former. Note that the state of the labour market plays two roles ￿ first it provides the 
￿raw material￿ necessary for the office to produce job entries. Second, it proxies  
labour market tightness and hence the ease or otherwise of placing claimants in jobs.  
 
The incentive scheme ran from April 2002 to March 2003, and this is the period of 
our data. Note that although Jobcentre Plus employees were informed about incentive 
scheme in April 2002, they did not know the specific targets until June 2002. It would 
obviously be very desirable to have data before the scheme was implemented to allow 
a difference-in-difference technique. Unfortunately this is simply not possible ￿ the 
                                                 
18 These are largely self-contained local labour markets, defined by 75% of those living there also 
working there, and 75% of those working there also living there. There are some 400 covering Britain. 
19 National Online Manpower Information Service, http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/ .   20
district boundaries were re-drawn in 2002, and different PSA targets were in operation 
before April 2002, implying a different set of output measures.  
 
5. Estimation  results 
 
We present results first for the main quantity variable, then for the quality measures; 
we finally estimate them jointly, allowing for production interdependencies. 
 




Figure 1 shows the distribution of the annual job entry points totals, and unconditional 
comparisons across different office and district types. Comparing offices in non-
incentivised districts with non-Pathfinder offices in incentivised districts is closest to a 
like-with-like comparison, and we see that the distributions are fairly similar.   
Pathfinder offices are clearly associated with lower mean job entry figures.   
 
We need to control for a number of different factors in order to isolate any potential 
incentive effect. Table 1 presents the results for the (log) annual totals of job entry 
points. We present a number of different specifications for the effects of the incentive 
scheme, along with the office characteristics.  
 
We start with basic office characteristics in column 1.  Big offices (defined in terms of 
front-line staff) produce more job entries. This is a strong and well-defined effect. The 
measure of the quality of staff also has a positive effect on job entries. This is 
measured as the private-public wage gap in the local area, and has a negative impact 
on job entries ￿ a high wage gap implies lower quality workers in the public sector, 
including JP. District Offices (with central administrative functions) yield more job 
entries. An established Pathfinder office produces significantly fewer job entries than 
an otherwise equivalent office; an office becoming a Pathfinder office within the year   21
shows no effect on job entries
20.  The state of demand in the labour market has no 
influence on job entries. As we shall see below, this is misleading and in fact reflects 
the two effects we noted above cancelling out. Once we run the two-stage approach 
below to isolate time-series variation from cross-section variation, we will find that 
labour market variation plays a strong role. 
 
The main variables of interest relate to the incentive scheme.  The simple comparison 
in column 2 shows that the scheme has an insignificant effect, reflecting the 
impression of Figure 1. However, in column 3 we allow for heterogeneity of response, 
possibly reflecting free-rider and peer pressure issues, by including an interaction of 
incentivisation status and office size. This yields a significant incentive effect, a 
positive effect that declines with office size.  This fits the discussion above in that 
bigger offices face a greater free-rider problem and so the incentive payment is less 
effective in eliciting higher effort.  In columns 4 and 5 we include the number of 
offices in the district
21, and allow its effect to differ in incentivised and non- 
incentivised districts.  It has no effect in the latter and a negative effect in the former. 
This suggests that there is little interaction between offices in non-incentivised 
districts, but that it is attempted in incentivised districts.   The interaction is however 
far less effective in districts with many offices.  Finally in column 5, we examine 
whether the number of high grade staff in the office has any independent effect but it 
appears not to. This regression explains about half of the variation between offices, 
and shows significant and heterogeneous effects from the incentive scheme. 
 
Monthly data – two stage approach 
 
The use of the annual totals rules out analysis of within-year time series variation in 
performance. This is essential to isolate the role of exogenous shocks to output from 
the labour market, and also to confirm the results in Table 1. We run fixed effects 
regressions on the 932 offices; time-varying variables are log front-line staff, log 
labour market, and a set of monthly time dummies
22. The results, alongside the pooled 
OLS, are shown in Table 2. The pooled OLS shows a strong effect of staff and a 
                                                 
20 This is presumably because staff in these offices are performing benefits-related activities as well as 
job entry tasks. The newer Pathfinder offices show no effect as they were changed on average late on in 
the year. 
21 These are offices with positive job entries ￿ not all JP offices.   22
positive effect of the labour market inflow ratio. The equivalent fixed effect 
regression shows a much diminished staff coefficient and a doubled labour market 
coefficient. Our interpretation of these results is that the pure time-series variation 
exploited in the fixed effect regressions isolates the environmental influence of labour 
market tightness on job entries. The cross-sectional influence of the labour market on 
job entries is captured by the fixed effect. Conversely, almost all of the variation in 
staff is across offices and very little over time within an office, and so the fixed effect 
regression picks up little impact of this on outcomes.  
 
We extract the estimated office effects, and subject these to the same analysis as the 
annual totals, presented in Table 3. Note that these necessarily have mean zero, but we 
adjust them by adding back the grand mean to ensure they have the same mean as the 
equivalent raw data. The results are very similar. They will not be identical as the 
dependent variable in Table 3 is essentially the adjusted mean of the monthly log job 
entries, and the dependent variable in Table 1 is the log of the total job entry points 
(not the total of the monthly log values). One substantial difference is that in Table 3 
the labour market variable is significantly negative, compared to insignificance in 
Table 1. This represents the cross-section variation in labour market tightness, with 
both the job entries and claimant inflows purged of time series variation. This 
negative effect is interpretable as the fact that, all else constant, areas with higher 
inflow of job seekers will have higher job entries. The main results on the impact of 
the incentivisation remain the same, or are slightly stronger. 
 
We can also explore the role of labour market risk in this context. We expect that in 
markets where the noise involved in the production process is substantial, optimal 
effort will be lower. Accordingly we add to the specification the coefficient of 
variation of the labour market indicator and also interacted this with incentivisation 
status. The results show that the degree of risk matters significantly for all offices, but 






                                                                                                                                            
22 A variety of different functional forms were tried ￿ see Burgess et al (2003).   23
Matching results 
 
The above results correctly identify the effect of the scheme if allocation to the pilot 
incentive scheme was random as we believe. However, it is useful to consider another 
approach as well. We first compare the characteristics of incentivised and non-
incentivised districts and offices in Table 4. This shows that incentivised districts are 
larger, both with more staff per office (35 compared to 29 on average), and more 
offices (16 compared to 12). They appear to face very similar labour market 
conditions.  
 
We implement a matched estimator which yields an unbiased estimate if assignment 
to incentivisation status is conditional mean independent from the propensity score. 
We set up the propensity score matching as follows
23. Even though districts are the 
basis for assignment into the treated (incentivised) category, we compute propensity 
scores at office level because offices are the unit of analysis. We include all non-
Pathfinder offices in incentivised districts and all offices in non-incentivised districts, 
as Pathfinder offices are unlikely to find a close match. We estimate the conditional 
probability of assignment to incentivisation status, based on a set of observable 
variables. These variables might influence choice of pilot areas and/or the outcome 
variables. The propensity score estimator (probit) is shown in Table 5. We see that 
there are some significant influences on an office￿s chance of being selected ￿ the size 
of the office, the number of offices in the district, (both of which were controlled for 
above) and some regional effects. We adopt a smoothed and weighted matching 
estimator. Predicted probabilities from the probit are used as weights to construct a 
synthetic control observation for each incentivised office; the weights are proportional 
to an Epanechnikov kernel. We impose a requirement of common support on the 
match following Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997). All observations for the 
control group whose propensity score is outside the range of the propensity score in 
the treatment sample are deleted.  
 
We first make a simple comparison of the overall treated sample and matched 
controls, using the estimated office fixed effect. This is in Table 6a and yields the 
                                                 
23 We are very grateful to Barbara Sianesi for making her implementation of PS matching in Stata 
available.    24
average treatment on the treated. Since it is the average effect, it necessarily omits 
heterogeneity that we found to be important above. Unsurprisingly it yields an 
insignificant negative effect
24, as in column 2 of tables 1 and 3. However, the 
heterogeneity of response in this study is a central part of the argument rather than a 
nuisance, linked to free-rider issues and optimal team structure. Accordingly, we 
partition the sample into eight cells, split into the quartiles of the office size 
distribution, and above and below mean number of offices per district. We re-
calculate the matched difference separately within each of these cells; the results are 
in Table 6b. We find some supporting evidence of the findings above: the estimated 
incentive effect is generally declining in office size and is generally lower in districts 
with fewer offices. The effect is positive in all small and very small offices, and 
negative in all large and very large offices. The top left cell does not fit in with the 
pattern. Significance levels are low.  
 
However, conducting these eight independent tests reduces efficiency levels. In order 
to better parameterise the response heterogeneity (and to control for any remaining 
differences between treated and control offices), we run the regressions in Table 1 on 
the matched sample only
25. This is in the spirit of Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 
(1997) for non-experimental data. The results are in table 7 and confirm a significant 
positive effect of the scheme, declining with office size. The number of offices in the 
district does not appear to be important here. 
 
To summarise the findings on the impact of the scheme on the main quantity variable 
targeted: we find evidence of a significant positive effect of incentivisation on output, 
declining as the size of the team increases. This fits with previous results on free-
riding and Kandel and Lazear￿s (1992) result of peer pressure decreasing after some 
critical unit size. There is also some evidence that a large number of offices in a 
district attenuates the impact. It is perhaps surprising that the incentive scheme 
generates negative as opposed to zero effects for large offices. To some extent this is 
misleading ￿ only one office has a predicted incentive effect that is significantly 
below zero. But it may also be reflecting a real phenomenon. It may be that the 
                                                 
24 Bootstrapped standard errors were derived by 1000 replications. 
25 The sample is made up of treated (non-PF) offices and matched controls using nearest-neighbour 
matching.   25
contractualisation of effort in a public service conflicts with individual￿s intrinsic 
motivation and reduces work effort. It may also be that the extra managerial effort 
required to implement and monitor the scheme in large efforts subtracts significantly 
from direct work effort; conversations with JP officials lend credence to this story.  
 
(b) Quality ￿ job-seeker and employer service 
 
We adopt a similar approach to modelling quality outcomes. We choose to model the 
quality of service to job-seekers (JSQ) and to employers (EMQ). Recall that these 
outcomes are monitored differently ￿ they are only measured quarterly (cf. monthly 
for quantity) and at district (cf. office) level. This has implications for behaviour as set 
out above, but also for our estimation: this reduces our observations from over 900 




The Appendix Table gives the mean response on these two quality measures, 84.4% 
success rating for JSQ and 88.6% for EMQ. The table also shows little variation in 
these scores across districts for JSQ, but more for EMQ. In fact, all districts hit their 
targets for JSQ, whilst only 64% did for EMQ.  
 
Table 8 shows the results for the district annual averages for JSQ and EMQ. Few 
variables are estimated to have a significant effect, due in part to the small number of 
observations and the lack of variation in JSQ. For both, the number of staff in the 
office has a negative effect. This may arise from a more personal service in smaller 
offices. The tightness of the labour market has a negative impact on JSQ and a 
stronger negative effect on EMQ. This makes sense: a tight labour market means a 
difficult time for employers to fill vacancies. It may also mean that JP staff are more 
pressured for both client groups. There is no significant impact of any term involving 
incentivisation status on JSQ, and one weakly positive effect on EMQ. 
 
Monthly data – two stage approach 
 
We repeat the two-stage approach for these two quality outcomes. The results are in 
Table 9, exploiting the quarterly variation and estimating district fixed effects, and in 
Table 10, analysing these fixed effects. The results differ little from the annual   26
average estimates above, and find no effect of incentivisation on JSQ. There is a 
positive effect of incentivisation on EMQ, though only significant at 10%.  The 





We finally repeat the matching procedure outlined above on the quality outcomes. 
The results are in Table 11, and the regression on the matched sample is in Table 12. 
These results confirm that there appears to be no impact of the scheme on quality of 
service under JSQ and a positive effect in EMQ, significant only at 10%.  
 
Summarising, we find little significant effect of incentivisation on quality outcomes. 
This can be taken in two different ways. First, it could be argued that the scheme 
failed to elicit any increase. This is not surprising in that the precision of the 
monitoring technology for quality was low (measured infrequently at a high level of 
aggregation), implying a low optimal effort allocation to this component of the job. 
Second, it could be viewed more positively as showing that despite the greater effort 
on quantity, quality did not actually fall, a standard failing of many incentive 
schemes. Whether this is due to the incentive scheme explicitly targeting quality, or 
whether due to the existence of sufficient slack to permit the increase in quantity, is 
difficult to say. 
 
(c) Quantity and Quality together 
 
There are two points to make in this section. First, the contrast between the significant 
effect of the scheme on quantity and lack of effect on quality is interesting. It may be 
that this arises from the differing measurement precision for the two aspects of the 
job, or it may simply be statistical ￿ 90 observations in one case compared to over 900 
in the other. Since this matters for incentive scheme design, we get at this by re-
running the quantity regression at district level. To do this, we used as the dependent 
variable (log) district annual job entry points. The results are in Table 13. They 
continue to show a positive impact of incentivisation, declining with office size. This 
suggests that there is something different about the behavioural response to the 
quantity and quality targets. This is straightforwardly explicable in terms of the 
differences in the precision of the monitoring technology. It fits well with the results   27
of Gaynor and Pauly (1990) noted above: they show that output was significantly 
higher in medical practices in which compensation was more directly related to 
productivity. 
 
The second issue is an estimation one. Since time allocated to quantity or to quality is 
determined jointly, we need to take account of that in estimation. The first step is 
simply to establish whether good performance on one dimension is positively or 
negatively correlated with good performance on the other. Using the annual totals 
(averages), the results are: 
 
Correlation of district performance on quantity and quality 





Quality ￿ JSQ    -0.018 
-0.163 (weighted) 
Weighted by district staff numbers. 
 
In fact, we see that there is little correlation. If we take EMQ as more useful a 
measure given the low variation in JSQ, there is a low positive association.  
Second, we estimate the district-level annual quantity and EMQ models jointly using 
SUR. Given the low correlations noted above, we would not expect a large change in 
the standard errors and this is indeed the case, as Table 14 shows.  
 
6.  Valuing the impact of the incentive scheme 
 
We evaluate the quantitative importance of the change in the quantity outcome in 
three ways. Since we do not find much effect on quality, we focus only on quantity. 
The evaluations below focus just on the incentivised districts, not the whole system. 
 
(a) Quantification of Scheme Effect 
 
Given the estimates in Table 3, column 4, we can straightforwardly calculate the 
distribution of change in job entry points associated with the incentive scheme. Since 
the impact varies according to office and district size, we report this distribution as   28
well as the mean ￿ see Table 15. As would be expected from Tables 1 and 3 column 
2, the overall effect of incentivisation is about zero. There is a substantial positive 
effect in small offices and districts, offset by a negative effect in larger units.   
However, it makes sense to quantify the impact of the scheme in the contexts in which 
it worked (whilst bearing in mind that the overall effect was zero) in order to appraise 
the potential quantitative significance of such schemes. In fact, the mean in small 
offices (in any district) and the mean in small districts (across all offices) are both 
around 10%, so this seems a reasonable value to follow up. A 10% overall increase 
translates to around 17,000 job entry points in small districts, or approximately 
converting back into people, about 3,400 extra people.  This is simply a first stage 
summary ￿ we look at the impact on steady-state unemployment below. 
 
The ex post cost of the job entry component of the scheme was around £272,100, 
0.21% of the salary bill for the 17 incentivised districts. This derives from 5 of the 17 
hitting their job entry target and earning 1% of salary (allowing for different numbers 
of staff). All 5 who hit were small districts. The ex ante cost depends on the level that 
the target thresholds were set at, and the implicit success probability management 
thereby set.  
 
(b) Impact of the Scheme on Unemployment 
 
It is clear that the operation of the incentive scheme does not create new jobs. Nor 
does it help into employment people who would otherwise have remained 
unemployed forever. So a ￿cost per job created￿ is not directly appropriate. The 
scheme accelerates movement into work of its clients, and one way to evaluate that is 
to return to the labour market model in (1) and analyse the implied unemployment 
rate. Given an unemployment exit rate of x, and an inflow rate of i, the steady-state 
unemployment rate is given by  () x i i u + =
* . We assume that the inflow rate is 
unaffected by the JP incentive scheme, and that the exit rate is x = k. (JE/U), where k 
> 1 allows that not all those leaving unemployment do so to jobs, JE is job entries as 
modelled above, and U is the stock of unemployed. From (1), x = k.A.(V/U)
1-α ,  and A 
= α .W, is the JP office effect, with α  (office effort) depending on the incentive 
scheme. It is easy to show that:    29
() ()
*
, 1 * u i x x
u − − = + − =
α η       ( 9 )  
where η denotes elasticity. Given an overall mean effect of zero, clearly the mean 
effect on unemployment is also zero. However, taking the mean value of a 10% 
increase from the small districts, this produces a mean percentage decrease in 
unemployment of 9.5% given a national mean unemployment rate of 5.1% at end 
2002; this is a fall of almost one half a percentage point. 
 
(c) Effort, Quality or Quantity of Staff? Incentive scheme, general pay rise or more 
staff 
 
A final metric for the evaluating the size of the incentivisation effect is to compare it 
to raising the quality of staff through a general pay rise, and to simply having more 
staff. We can do this straightforwardly through the estimated production function.  
Using column 4 of table 3, we compute the change in the private-public pay 
differential (£ per hour) required to produce a 10% increase in job entry points. This is 
given by ln(1.1)/(-0.018), equal to ￿5.29. Thus a £5 an hour pay increase in the public 
sector would, through recruitment of higher quality staff, on average elicit the same 
output improvement as this scheme does (in small districts). Given that the average 
hourly pay in the organisation was £8.70 at the time, a £5 per hour increase would be 
extremely expensive, and way above the cost of the incentive scheme.  
Turning to an increase in staff, a similar calculation shows that a 10% increase in 
output would require a 19.4% increase in staff and hence the salary bill. Again this is 
very high compared to the cost of the incentive scheme of 0.213% of the salary bill in 
small districts.  
Note that even if we have dramatically over-stated the output effect of the incentive 
scheme, even a 1% increase in output would have made this scheme cost effective on 




There is a dearth of evidence on the role and impact of performance pay in the public 
sector ￿ a sector that employs as many people in the UK as manufacturing does. This 
paper starts to fill that gap by providing an evaluation of a pilot scheme of financial   30
incentives in a major UK government agency, Jobcentre Plus. The incentive scheme 
was based on teams rather than individuals and covered five different targets, 
measured with varying degrees of precision. It offered a maximum bonus of 7.5% of 
salary if all targets were hit. Using data from the agency￿s performance management 
system and personnel records, plus matched labour market data, we evaluate the 
impact of the scheme. We focus on three main issues: whether performance pay 
matters for public service workers, what the team basis of the scheme implies, and the 
impact of the differential measurement precision. 
 
We show that the use of performance pay did have a significant effect on the main 
quantity measure (job placements), but that there was important heterogeneity of 
response. This heterogeneity was patterned as one would expect from a free rider 
versus peer monitoring perspective. We found that the incentive had a substantial 
positive effect in small offices, and in offices in small districts. In districts with many 
offices, and in large offices, the scheme reduced output. Our interpretation of this is 
that peer monitoring and better information flows can overcome free rider problems in 
small units, but that it fails in teams made up of many people, or dispersed among 
many offices (see Kandel and Lazear, 1992, and papers by Gaynor and co-authors). 
The impact of performance pay on quantity was not matched by any impact on 
different quality measures. One key difference between the quantity and quality 
targets is the precision of measurement. Job placements are measured monthly at 
office level, with a clear, direct effect of an individual￿s effort to the target measure. 
Quality measures are based on samples of different clients￿ experiences, and are only 
measured quarterly at district level. In this case, an individual￿s effort is only 
measured probabilistically, and is in any case submerged in a much broader total. Our 
findings suggest that individuals responded to this by focussing their effort on 
quantity rather than quality (see Pauly and Gaynor, 1990).  
 
We quantify the economic significance of the scheme in a number of ways. Given the 
heterogeneity of response, in fact the overall mean impact is close to zero. However, 
we examine the size of the positive effect in the small districts where the scheme did 
work. We compute the implied number of additional job placements, and the 
reduction in the equilibrium unemployment rate. These are non-trivial numbers for a 
very inexpensive scheme. We also compare the cost-effectiveness of performance pay   31
with a general pay rise (raising worker quality) and simply the addition of more staff. 
Our estimates suggest that the use of incentive pay delivers equivalent output 
increases as the other two at very significantly lower cost.  
 
Indeed, the mean increase in small districts of job placements was around 10%
26, and 
this may seem too high for the modest size of the bonus. There are a number of 
caveats that need to be mentioned. First, the scheme only operated for one year, and 
so the results may include a ￿first year￿ novelty effect in addition to the pure incentive 
effect. Furthermore, if a ￿ratchet￿ design of continual percentage improvements were 
repeated in a dynamic setting, the optimal response would be different to the response 
we have measured to a possibly once-only pilot. Second, the outcome may be the 
result of performance management per se, rather than the financial reward attached. 
This seems unlikely in that the same performance management system was in place 
everywhere, across the control offices as well as the pilot offices. It may be that the 
financial incentives led managers to take the existing framework more seriously but 
that is surely part of the aim of performance pay. Third, Jobcentre Plus may be an 
organisation with a lot of slack in it. Unemployment and job-seeking has fallen 
considerably since the peaks of the 1980s (though it has been stable at a low level in 
recent years), and it may be that staff are less hard-pressed than before. Finally, it may 
be that the assignment to the pilot was not completely random and differentially 
included high-performing offices. Whilst possible, this seems to be unlikely given the 
nature of the assignment process. Districts were included in the pilot if one office in 
that district had been selected to be a Pathfinder office. Given the few operational 
links between offices, this is essentially  random assignment for other offices in that 
district.  
 
There are a lot more issues that we can address with this data. We have ignored 
within-year and between-office effects on output in this paper, but this seems a likely 
source of strategic behaviour. The awarding of differential job entry points for 
different client groups is also of interest, and given available data on the inflow of 
these groups, we can analyse the degree to which offices do respond differently to 
people and points. Finally, whilst we have controlled for the impact of the 
                                                 
26 Balanced by a mean in large districts of ￿5%.   32
environment (the state of the labour market) on the outcome, we have not allowed 
differential response across offices to the ups and downs of the local labour market.  
These are all on our agenda. 
 
We finally draw some tentative conclusions for the design of performance pay 
schemes in the public sector. There are some obvious conclusions ￿ team size needs to 
be small, and preferably not dispersed over many sites. The connection between effort 
and output needs to be as clear and well-measured as possible. There are trade-offs 
here: precise measurement may be very expensive if conducted for many small teams. 
Less obvious conclusions are the role of environmental risk. In the context of this 
organisation, changes in the local labour market affect the targeted outcome: a one-
standard deviation change in the labour market variable has on average a 1.1% impact 
on job entry points
27. This is not trivial at the margin, and suggests that some broad 
conditionality of the scheme may be useful. Finally, there are lessons for the structure 
of organisations as well as for the nature of optimal incentive schemes. Dewatripont, 
Jewitt and Tirole (1999) make this point in the context of mission definition, but it 
also applies here to team size and task measurement. If incentives are indeed a very 
cost-effective way of inducing greater output given the right team size, then 
organisations could be re-structured to create natural teams of the appropriate size. 
Such re-structuring could also allow for relative performance evaluation to filter away 
common uncertainty. These points also fit well with the general ethos of devolved 
agency inherent in many current public service reforms. 
                                                 
27 Using the estimates from table 3, column 4, and given that the mean (across offices) standard 
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Table 1: Ooffice annual job entry analysis 
Dependent variable is log (annual total of job entry points) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pathfinder  Status  -0.607 -0.579 -0.520 -0.585 -0.582 
 (0.079)*** (0.091)*** (0.095)*** (0.098) *** (0.098) *** 
District  Office  0.047 0.046 0.046 0.050 0.052 
  (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
JCP  Status  -0.053 -0.023 -0.026 -0.065 -0.063 
  (0.064) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) 
Private  Public  Wage  Gap  -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.007)*** (0.007) *** (0.007) *** (0.007) *** (0.007) *** 
Log  Annual  Frontline  Staff  0.720 0.720 0.743 0.736 0.735 
 (0.021) *** (0.021) *** (0.024) *** (0.024) *** (0.024) *** 
Log  Mean  Labour  Market  0.033 0.033 0.039 0.048 0.048 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
Incentivisation  Status    -0.035 0.274 0.489 0.481 
   (0.054)  (0.160)*  (0.212)**  (0.212)** 
Incentivisation * Mean Frontline 
Staff 
    -0.100 -0.100 -0.101 
      (0.049)** (0.049)** (0.049)** 
No. Offices per District        -0.009  -0.009 
      (0.005)*  (0.005)* 
Incentivisation * No. Offices per 
District 
    -0.011  -0.010 
      (0.009)  (0.009) 
Office Mean %  High Grade Staff          -0.958 
       (0.582) 
Constant  6.318 6.322 6.251 6.370 6.405 
 (0.070) *** (0.070) *** (0.078) *** (0.104) *** (0.106) *** 
Observations  932 932 932 932 932 
R-squared  0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2: Monthly job entry first stage 
Dependent variable is log (job entry points) 
 (1)  (2) 
Log Frontline Staff  0.690  0.199 
 (0.008)***  (0.025)*** 
Log Labour Market  0.072  0.190 
 (0.018)***  (0.016)*** 
July 2002  -0.023  -0.013 
 (0.028)  (0.013) 
August 2002  0.173  0.187 
 (0.028)***  (0.013)*** 
September 2002  0.099  0.071 
 (0.028)***  (0.013)*** 
October 2002  0.274  0.265 
 (0.028)***  (0.014)*** 
November 2002  0.063  0.079 
 (0.028)**  (0.013)*** 
December 2002  -0.618  -0.601 
 (0.028)***  (0.013)*** 
January 2003  0.097  0.188 
 (0.032)***  (0.019)*** 
February 2003  -0.155  -0.145 
 (0.028)***  (0.014)*** 
March 2003  -0.256  -0.289 
 (0.028)***  (0.013)*** 
Constant 3.862  5.361 
 (0.032)***  (0.079)*** 
Observations 9312  9312 
R-squared 0.51  0.46 
Number of offices     962 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Analysis of the office fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Pathfinder  Status  -0.743 -0.717 -0.552 -0.631  -0.630  -0.631 
  (0.093)** (0.108)** (0.121)** (0.123)**  (0.123)**  (0.123)** 
District  Office  0.058 0.058 0.054 0.056  0.056  0.048 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080)  (0.081)  (0.080) 
JCP  Status  -0.058 -0.031 -0.039 -0.121  -0.120  -0.120 
  (0.077) (0.096) (0.096) (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.099) 
Private Public Wage Gap  -0.019  -0.018  -0.019  -0.018  -0.018  -0.024 
  (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.009)**  (0.009)**  (0.009)** 
Log  Annual  Frontline  Staff  0.462 0.462 0.494 0.492  0.492  0.474 
  (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.027)** (0.027)**  (0.027)**  (0.028)** 
Log  Mean  Labour  Market  -0.199 -0.199 -0.193 -0.185  -0.184  -0.163 
  (0.047)** (0.047)** (0.047)** (0.047)**  (0.047)**  (0.048)** 
Incentivisation Status    -0.030  0.108  0.537  0.534  0.427 
   (0.065)  (0.079)  (0.176)**  (0.176)**  (0.231)* 
Incentivisation * Mean Frontline Staff      -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
     (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
Number of Offices per District        -0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
      (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Incentivisation * No. Offices per 
District 
    -0.025  -0.025  -0.025 
      (0.010)**  (0.010)**  (0.010)** 
Office Mean %  High Grade Staff          -0.138  -0.085 
       (0.610)  (0.609) 
Labour Market Time Series Variation            -0.721 
         (0.289)** 
Incentivisation * Labour Market Time 
Series Variation 
       0.390 
         (0.570) 
Constant  4.803 4.808 4.703 4.730  4.735  4.946 
 (0.106)*** (0.106) *** (0.111) *** (0.136) *** (0.138) *** (0.161) *** 
Observations  962 962 962 962  962  962 
R-squared  0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33  0.33  0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Characteristics of the districts and offices by incentive status 











          





262 12 1.235 
 Mean  14.319  482.353  15.936  1.148 
Incentivised 
Districts 
Median 14 483  18  1.241 
          
 








        






Offices in   Mean  14.617  35.418  1.174 
Incentivised 
Districts 
Median 14  27  1.115 
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Table 5: Probit to estimate propensity score 
Dependent variable is Incentivisation status 
Mean Frontline Staff  -0.032 
 (0.015)** 
Office Frontline Staff Variance  0.025 
 (0.019) 
Office Frontline Staff Squared  -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Frontline Staff * No. Offices  0.001 
 (0.001) 
Office Mean Labour Market  -0.018 
 (0.313) 
Office Labour Market Variance  -0.340 
 (0.574) 
Labour Market * Frontline Staff  0.018 
 (0.010)* 
No. Offices per District  -0.615 
 (0.085)*** 
No. Offices per District Squared  0.028 
 (0.003)*** 
Regional Variables  




North East  0.168 
 (0.444) 
North West  0.697 
 (0.319)** 
Office for Scotland  0.662 
 (0.305)** 
Office for Wales  0.297 
 (0.336) 
South East  -3.056 
 (0.470)*** 
South West  -0.701 
 (0.380)* 








2 = 0.2813 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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  Off support  On support  Total 
Untreated  0  739  739 
Treated 65  108  173 
  65  847  912 
     
     
     
Average Treatment of the 
Treated 
-0.052    
  (0.071)    
Standard error in parentheses 
 
 




   Very small  Small  Large  Very Large 
 Small  0.0847 0.2549  -0.0382 -0.1195 
    (0.128) (0.300)  (0.108)  (0.108) 
District Size  Obs 90  98  120  129 
 Large  0.2922 0.1536  -0.2052 -0.1329 
   (0.084)**  (0.175)  (0.207)  (0.211) 
 obs  130  102  101  62 
Standard errors in parentheses  41
Table 7: Annual job entry analysis on matched sample 
Dependent variable is log (annual total job entry points) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
District Office  0.137  0.137  0.115  0.116  0.131 
 (0.136)  (0.137)  (0.132)  (0.135)  (0.135) 
Private Public Wage Gap  -0.028  -0.030  -0.014  -0.013  -0.016 
 (0.014)**  (0.014)**  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Log Annual Frontline Staff  0.784  0.785  0.927  0.925  0.927 
 (0.041)*** (0.041) *** (0.059) *** (0.062) *** (0.062) *** 
Log Mean Labour Market  0.176  0.176  0.296  0.293  0.261 
 (0.155)  (0.156)  (0.154)*  (0.156)*  (0.159) 
Incentivisation Status    0.021  0.817  0.850  0.867 
   (0.072)  (0.257) *** (0.318) *** (0.318) *** 
Incentivisation * Mean 
Frontline Staff 
   -0.264  -0.260  -0.264 
     (0.082) *** (0.085) *** (0.085) *** 
No. Offices per District        0.002  0.001 
       (0.013)  (0.013) 
Incentivisation * No. Offices 
per District 
    -0.004  -0.003 
       (0.019)  (0.019) 
% High Grade Staff per District          -1.184 
         (1.066) 
Constant 5.921  5.909  5.470  5.457  5.489 
 (0.133) *** (0.140) *** (0.192) *** (0.219) *** (0.220) *** 
Observations 124  124  124  124  124 
R-squared 0.76  0.76  0.78  0.78  0.79 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: District annual JSQ and EMQ analysis 
 
Dependent variables are log (annual district average JSQ outcome) and log (annual district 
average EMQ outcome)   
 (1)  (2) 
 JSQ  EMQ 
% PF offices per District  0.004  -0.014 
 (0.007)  (0.007)** 
% JCP offices per District  0.001  -0.002 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Private Public Wage Gap  -0.008  0.001 
 (0.001)***  (0.001) 
Log Mean District Frontline Staff   -0.026  -0.021 
 (0.008)***  (0.008)** 
Log Mean District Labour Market  -0.024  -0.059 
 (0.012)**  (0.012)*** 
Incentivisation Status  -0.034  0.038 
 (0.076)  (0.125) 
Incentivisation * District Frontline Staff  -0.004  0.021 
 (0.031)  (0.016) 
No. Offices per District  0.002  0.001 
 (0.001)**  (0.001) 
Incentivisation * No. Offices per District  -0.000  -0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.001)* 
Constant 0.001  0.068 
 (0.070)  (0.070) 
Observations 90  90 
R-squared 0.47  0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 9: District quarterly first stage regressions 
 
Dependent variables are log (district JSQ outcome) and log (district EMQ outcome) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  District Log JSQ  District Log EMQ 
  OLS  Fixed effect  OLS  Fixed effect 
Log District Frontline Staff  -0.018  0.039  -0.011  0.005 
 (0.006)***  (0.020)*  (0.005)**  (0.038) 
Log District Labour Market  0.011  0.017  -0.043  0.008 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009)***  (0.022) 
September 2002  -0.022  -0.021  -0.054  -0.056 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.008)***  (0.007)*** 
December 2002  -0.009  -0.008  -0.071  -0.067 
 (0.003)***  (0.004)**  (0.007)***  (0.007)*** 
March 2003  -0.004  -0.003  -0.057  -0.055 
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.008)***  (0.007)*** 
Constant -0.186  -0.118  -0.083  -0.075 
 (0.009)***  (0.025)***  (0.009)***  (0.047) 
Observations 359  359  359  359 
R-squared 0.12  0.16  0.30  0.33 
Number of District Identification Number    90    90 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10a: Regressions on the district JSQ fixed effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% PF Offices per District  0.000  0.003  0.004  0.005 
  (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% JCP Offices per District  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
District Private Public Wage Gap  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Log District Frontline Staff  -0.049  -0.050  -0.049  -0.059 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** 
Log District Mean Labour Market  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.014 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)** 
Incentivisation Status    -0.035  -0.037  -0.048 
   (0.078)  (0.079)  (0.079) 
Incentivisation * District Mean 
Frontline Staff 
   -0.005  -0.010 
     (0.033)  (0.039) 
No. Offices per District        0.002 
       (0.001)** 
Incentivisation * No. Offices per 
District 
    -0.000 
       (0.001) 
Constant  -0.240 -0.234 -0.233 -0.253 
  (0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** 
Observations  90 90 90 90 
R-squared  0.65 0.65 0.65 0.67 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10b: Regressions on the district EMQ fixed effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% PF Offices per District  0.001  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011 
  (0.001) (0.006)* (0.007) (0.007)* 
% JCP Offices per District  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
District Private Public Wage Gap  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log District Frontline Staff  -0.024  -0.022  -0.022  -0.025 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
Log District Mean Labour Market  -0.035  -0.035  -0.035  -0.036 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** 
Incentivisation Status    0.139  0.139  0.158 
   (0.075)*  (0.076)*  (0.077)** 
Incentivisation * District Mean 
Frontline Staff 
   -0.001  0.026 
     (0.032)  (0.038) 
No. Offices per District        0.001 
      (0.001) 
Incentivisation * No. Offices per 
District 
    -0.002 
      (0.001) 
Constant  -0.038 -0.061 -0.061 -0.070 
 (0.031)  (0.033)*  (0.033)*  (0.035)** 
Observations  90 90 90 90 
R-squared  0.32 0.34 0.34 0.36 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  46
Table 11: Propensity score matching results for JSQ and EMQ outcomes 
 
 
  Off support  On support  Total 
Untreated  0  73 73 
Treated  2  15 17 
  2  88 90 
 
JSQ 
     
Average Treatment of the Treated  -0.020 
   (0.0140)   
   
 
EMQ 
     
Average Treatment of the Treated  0.009 
   (0.0109)   
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Table 12a: Annual District JSQ analysis on matched sample 
 
Dependent variable is log (annual district average JSQ outcome)  
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% PF Offices per 
District 
0.001 0.001  -0.001  -0.002  0.002  0.003 
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
% JCP Offices per 
District 
0.010  0.010 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.009 
  (0.005)* (0.005)*  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
District Private 
Public Wage Gap 
-0.004  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.002)*  (0.002)*  (0.002)*  (0.002)*  (0.002)**  (0.002)* 
District Log 
Frontline Staff 
-0.024  -0.024 -0.024 -0.033 -0.057 -0.057 
 (0.010)**  (0.010)**  (0.011)**  (0.017)*  (0.019)**  (0.020)*** 
District Log Mean 
Labour Market 
0.014  0.014 0.013 0.013 0.006 0.009 
  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Incentivisation 
Status 
   0.017  0.022  -0.009  -0.021 




     0.040  0.086  0.086 
       (0.052)  (0.060)  (0.061) 
No. Offices per 
District 
       0.003  0.003 
         (0.001)***  (0.002)* 
Incentivisation * 
No. Offices per 
District 
       -0.003  -0.002 
         (0.002)  (0.002) 
% High Grade 
Staff per District 
       -0.394 
         (0.691) 
Constant  -0.333  -0.333 -0.343 -0.368 -0.389 -0.387 
  (0.064)***  (0.064)*** (0.095)*** (0.101)*** (0.097)*** (0.098)*** 
Observations  30  30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared  0.41  0.41 0.41 0.42 0.53 0.54 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 12b: Annual District EMQ analysis on matched sample 
 
Dependent variable is log (annual district average EMQ outcome)  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
% PF Offices per District  0.002  0.002  -0.017  -0.019  -0.017  -0.019 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.010)  (0.010)*  (0.011)  (0.010)* 
% JCP Offices per District  -0.007  -0.007  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.003 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
District Private Public 
Wage Gap 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  -0.000 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
District Log Frontline Staff  -0.022  -0.022  -0.020  -0.029  -0.028  -0.026 
 (0.011)*  (0.011)*  (0.010)*  (0.016)*  (0.020)  (0.019) 
District Log Mean Labour 
Market 
-0.024 -0.024 -0.027 -0.027 -0.021  -0.030 
 (0.012)**  (0.012)**  (0.011)**  (0.011)**  (0.013)  (0.013)** 
Incentivisation  Status      0.220 0.224 0.215  0.251 
     (0.118)*  (0.119)*  (0.120)*  (0.117)** 
Incentivisation * Mean 
Frontline Staff 
    0.036  0.070  0.071 
       (0.051)  (0.062)  (0.060) 
No. Offices per District          -0.000  0.000 
         (0.002)  (0.001) 
Incentivisation * No. 
Offices per District 
     -0.002  -0.003 
         (0.002)  (0.002) 
% High Grade Staff per 
District 
      1.119 
           (0.673) 
Constant -0.046  -0.046  -0.173  -0.195  -0.194  -0.200 
 (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.094)*  (0.100)*  (0.100)*  (0.096)* 
Observations 30  30  30  30  30  30 
R-squared  0.40 0.40 0.48 0.49 0.54  0.60 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 13: District level annual job entry analysis 
 
Dependent variable is log (district total annual total job entry points) 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
% PF Offices per District  -0.010  -0.111  -0.081  -0.050 
  (0.006) (0.072) (0.077)  (0.066) 
% JCP Offices per District  0.020  0.038  0.038  0.032 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.026) 
District Private Public Wage Gap  -0.023  -0.025  -0.025  -0.023 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.013)* 
District Log Annual District Mean 
Frontline Staff 
0.659 0.671 0.710  0.498 
  (0.073)*** (0.073)*** (0.081)***  (0.081)*** 
District Log Mean Labour Market  0.039  0.026  0.037  -0.201 
  (0.130) (0.130) (0.130)  (0.119)* 
Incentivisation Status    1.196  2.336  2.737 
   (0.849)  (1.334)*  (1.230)** 
Incentivisation * District Mean 
Frontline Staff 
   -0.177  -0.275 
     (0.160)  (0.162)* 
No. Offices per District        0.033 
      (0.007)*** 
Incentivisation * No. Offices per 
District 
    0.004 
      (0.013) 
Constant  7.988 7.682 7.379  8.819 
  (0.653)*** (0.685)*** (0.737)***  (0.692)*** 
Observations  90 90 90  90 
R-squared  0.56 0.57 0.57  0.70 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  50
Table 14: Joint (SUR) analysis of quantity and quality 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Log mean EMQ  Log annual Job Entry Points 
% PF Offices per District  -0.014  -0.050 
 (0.006)**  (0.063) 
% JCP Offices per District  -0.002  0.032 
 (0.003)  (0.025) 
Private Public Wage Gap  0.001  -0.023 
 (0.001)  (0.012)* 
Log Mean District Frontline 
Staff 
-0.021 0.498 
 (0.008)***  (0.076)*** 
Log Mean District Labour 
Market 
-0.059 -0.201 
 (0.011)***  (0.112)* 
Incentivisation Status  0.038  2.737 
 (0.118)  (1.159)** 
Incentivisation * District 
Frontline Staff 
0.021 -0.275 
 (0.016)  (0.153)* 
No. Offices per District  0.001  0.033 
 (0.001)  (0.007)*** 
Incentivisation * No. Offices per 
District 
-0.002 0.004 
 (0.001)*  (0.012) 
Constant 0.068  8.819 
 (0.066)  (0.652)*** 
Observations 90  90 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 15: Mean incentivisation effect 
 
 Frontline  Staff  ≤25 26-50  ≥51 Mean 
Mean staff all  13.2  38.6  100.2  49.3 
Mean estimated Incentivisation 
effect 
27.6  14.8  -13.6  10.2    
Small 
districts 
No. offices  22  26  21  69 
Mean  staff  all  13.7 36.4 83.5  34.1 
Mean estimated Incentivisation 
effect 
4.6  -9.3  -24.0  -5.1   
Large 
districts 
No. offices  78  45  30  153 
 
 
Mean estimated Incentivisation 
effect 






Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. (2003) ￿Incentives, Choice and Accountability in the 
Provision of Public Services￿ Oxford Review of Economic Policy vol. 19 no. 2 
pp. 235 ￿ 249 
 
Burgess, S., Propper, C., Ratto, M.L. and Tominey, E. (2003) ￿Incentives in the 
public sector: some evidence from a UK government agency￿, CMPO 
Working Paper Series No: 03/080. 
Burgess, S., and M. L. Ratto (2003) ￿The role of incentives in the public sector: issues 
and evidence￿, Oxford Review of Economic Policy vol. 19 no. 2. 
Chiappori, P.A.  and SalaniØ, B.  (2003) ￿Testing Contract Theory: a Survey of Some 
Recent Work￿, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics ￿ Theory and 
Applications, Eighth World Congress, M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and P. 
Turnovsky, ed., Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 115-149. 
Courty, P., and Marschke, G. (1997) ￿Measuring Government Performance: Lessons 
from a Federal Job-Training Program￿, American Economic Review, 87, 1997, 
pp.383-388. 
Courty, P., and Marschke, J.  (2004) ￿An empirical investigation of gaming responses 
to explicit performance incentives￿, Journal of Labor Economics. Vol. 22, no. 
2. 
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I. and Tirole, J. (1999) ￿The Economics of Career Concerns, 
Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies￿. 
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. pp. 
199-217. 
Dixit, A.  (2002) ￿Incentives and organisations in the public sector: an interpretative 
review￿ Journal of Human Resources, 37(4), pp.696-727. 
Encinosa III, W., Gaynor, M., and Rebitzer, J. (1997) ￿The sociology of groups and 
the economics of incentives￿, NBER Working Paper 5953 
Falk, A. and Ichino, A. (2003) ￿Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure￿ IZA Discussion 
paper no. 732. 
Gaynor, M., M. Pauly (1990) ￿Compensation and productive efficiency in 
partnerships: evidence from medical group practice￿ Journal of Political 
Economy, vol 98:33, 1990, 544-573.  
Gaynor, M., Rebitzer, J. B., and Taylor, L. J. (2001) ￿Incentives in HMOs￿, 
Economics Working Paper Archive 340, Levy Economics Institute 
Hamilton, B. H., Nickerson, J.A., and Owan, H.  (2003) ￿Team incentives and worker 
heterogeneity: an empirical analysis of the impact of teams on productivity 
and participation￿, Journal of Political Economy, 111(3), pp. 465-497. 
Heckman, J. Ichimura, H. and Todd, P. (1997) Matching as an Econometric 
Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme, 
Review of Economic Studies, 64, 605-654  53
Heckman, J. Smith, J., and Taber, C.  (1996) ￿What do bureaucrats do?  The effects of 
performance standards and bureaucratic preferences on acceptance into the 
JTPA program￿, NBER Working Paper 5535 
Holmstr￿m, B. (1982) ￿Moral hazard in teams￿, Bell Journal of Economics, 13, pp. 
324-340. 
Holmstr￿m, B. and Milgrom, P. (1990) ￿Regulating trade among agents￿, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 146(1), pp. 85-105. 
Holmstr￿m, B., and Milgrom, P. (1991) ￿Multi-task principal-agent analyses: Linear 
contracts, asset ownership and job design￿, Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organisation, vol 7, 24-52. 
Itoh, H. (1991) ￿Incentives to help in multi-agent situations￿, Econometrica, vol 59, 
(3), 611-636. 
Kahn, C. M., Silva, E. C. D., and Ziliak, J. P (2001) ￿Performance-based wages in tax 
collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and its effects￿, Economic 
Journal, 111(468), pp.188-205. 
Kandel, E. and Lazear, E. (1992) ￿Peer Pressure and Partnerships￿, Journal of 
Political Economy, 100 (4), pp. 801-817. 
Knez, M., and Simester, D. (2001) ￿Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring at 
Continental Airlines￿, Journal of Labor Economics, 19(4), pp.743-772. 
Lazear, E. (1999)  ￿Personnel economics: Past lessons and future directions￿, Journal 
of Labor Economics, 17,  pp.199-236. 
Lazear, E. (2001) ￿Performance pay and productivity￿, American Economic Review 
90:5 pp. 1346-1361. 
MacDonald, G. and Max, L.M. (2001) ￿Adverse Specialization￿, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol 109 (4), 864-899. 
Makinson, J. (2000) ￿Incentives for change. Rewarding performance in national 
government networks￿, Public Service Productivity Panel. HMSO.  
Malcomson, J.  (1999) ￿Incentive contracts in labor markets￿ in Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Vol.3, O.Ashenfelter and D.Card (eds), North Holland, 
Amsterdam 
Murphy, K, (1999) ￿Executive compensation￿, in Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Vol. 3, O.Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds North-Holland, Amsterdam 
Nickell,S. and Quintini, G. (2002) ￿The consequences of the decline in public sector 
pay in Britain: a little bit of evidence￿, Economic Journal, vol 112(477), 107-
118. 
Olson, M (1971) The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
 
Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1993) ￿Reinventing Government: How the 
Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector￿ Plume Books, 
(Penguin Group) New York. 
Paarsch, H. and Shearer, B. (2000) ￿Piece rates, fixed wages, and incentive effects: 
statistical evidence from payroll records￿, International Economic Review, vol 
41(1), 59-92.  54
Petrongolo, B. and Pissarides, C. (2001) ￿Looking into the black box: a survey of the 
matching function￿, Journal of Economics Literature, vol 39, 390-431. 
Prendergast, C. (1999) ￿The provision of incentives in firms￿, Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol 37, 7-63. 
Prendergast, C.  (2002) ￿The tenuous trade-off between risk and incentives￿, Journal 
of Political Economy, 110(5), pp. 1071-1102. 
White Paper ￿Modernising Government￿ (1999).  www.archive.official-
documents.co.uk 




Appendix 1: Data Descriptives 
 
 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation 
   Total Between  Within 
Office Level Variables         
Log Office Monthly Job Entry Points  5.8989  0.9709  0.8740  0.4323 
Office Pathfinder Status  0.0540  0.2261  0.2242  0.0000 
Office JCP Status  0.0621  0.2413  0.2558  0.0298 
District Office  0.0555  0.2290  0.2441  0.0000 
Private Public Wage Gap  -0.5504  2.4171  2.3819  0.0000 
Log Office Frontline Staff  3.0847  0.8562  0.8571  0.1965 
Office Frontline Staff Variance  4.5027  6.3942  6.1628  0.0000 
Log Office Labour Market  0.0906  0.4407  0.3114  0.3120 
Incentivisation Status  0.2409  0.4277  0.4256  0.0000 
Office Mean % High Grade Staff  0.0338  0.0340  0.0340  0.0000 
Labour Market Time Series Variation  0.2624  0.0567  0.0567  0.0000 
        
District Level Variables         
Log District Annual Job Entry Points  13.8177  0.3592  0.3610  0.0000 
Log District EMQ  -0.1267  0.0514  0.0248  0.0451 
Log District JSQ  -0.1703  0.0348  0.0278  0.0218 
% PF Offices per District  49.4324  103.9234 86.6939  17.8404 
% JCP Offices per District  0.0052  0.0217  0.0159  0.0166 
Log District Mean Frontline Staff  8.3573  0.4617  0.4511  0.0000 
Log District Labour Market  0.1304  0.3529  0.2168  0.2850 
No. Offices per District  11.6473  3.9807  4.2650  0.0000 
M * No. Offices per District  3.4562  6.6076  6.6025  0.0000  56
Appendix 2: Job Entry Priority Group Categories 
 
Priority Client Group 1  Job entry points score 12 
Jobless Lone Parents including people on the New Deal for Lone Parents 
Those on the New Deal for Disabled People 
People with Disabilities in receipt of a specified primary benefit 
Other people in receipt of a specified primary benefit 
Priority Client Group 2  Job entry points score 8 
People on the New Deal 50 plus 
People on the New Deal 25 plus 
Those on the New Deal for Young People 
Employment Zones 
Other People with Disabilities not included in Priority Client Group 1 
Jobseeker￿s Allowance (JSA) long term claimants 
Priority Client Group 3  Job entry points score 4 
JSA short term claimants 
Priority Client Group 4  Job entry points score 2 
Unemployed non claimants 
Priority Client Group 5  Job entry points score 1 
Employed People 
 
 